Electronic Market Design // 2006 - Present // NSF IIS-0527770
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Dan Friedman
,
Nirvikar Singh
,
Steven Gjerstad,
James C. Cox
,
Vjollca Sadiraj,
Chris Campbell
- Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
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Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment - Data
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- A laboratory Investigation of Deferral Options
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A laboratory Investigation of Deferral Options - Data
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Supported 2006-09 by NSF grant IIS-0527770, this project explores how humans and computerized agents interact in various one- and two-sided market formats. Asynchronous (real-time) interactions are emphasized.
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Networked Markets // 2004 - Present // SBR-0351801
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Dan Friedman
,
Alessandra Cassar
,
Patricia Higino Schneider
A central theoretical proposition in economics is that frictionless markets perform at 100% efficiency, and require only trivial links between buyers and sellers. Actual markets, however, face moderate to severe trading frictions, and rely on various sorts of buyer-seller links. We introduce two important frictions: possible cheating (e.g., a seller might ship an item of lower quality) and hidden trading opportunities (e.g., a buyer might not be aware of a low cost supplier). We will then introduce networks of links among traders, and examine the impact on market performance, including efficiency, prices, volume, and profit distribution. As suggested by ratings in on-line auctions or by the role of immigrant networks in international trade, the links among network members spread information, e.g., the identity of cheaters or the location of low cost sellers. Such links may boost market performance by fostering trust (based on reputation) and unifying trade. We will choose the network links in early series of experiments and allow traders to build their own networks in later series.
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Corporate Culture // 2008 - Present
Distributive Justice // 2007 - Present
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Ryan Oprea
,
Alessandra Cassar
,
Paul Viotti
Read the article posted on UCSC's website.
Continuous Games // 2009 - 2012 // SES-0925039
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Dan Friedman
,
Ryan Oprea
The project is to build a new computer platform, called Continuous Games (ConG), for studying strategic interaction in the laboratory. ConG will focus on continuous games - especially continuous time, but also continuous action sets and "large" player populations. Such continuous settings are often more realistic and easier to learn and have novel theoretical properties that have never been tested empirically.
We will use ConG to study games of conflict (e.g., prisoner's dilemma and social dilemmas) and games of coordination in which theory predicts far more efficient behavior in continuous time than in discrete time, as well as to study games in which the unique mixed strategy equilibrium has proven elusive in discrete laboratory environments. Later we will study homotopies, games whose strategic character gradually changes over time. We will also examine a set of applied games-- such as strategic pricing, quantity setting and location choice -- for which continuous time settings are simply more realistic.
When the software is mature (target date: late 2011), we shall make ConG easily accessible via EconPort (a National Digital Library facility). Researchers will be able to run many variants on our games merely by downloading the software and resetting the parameters. With a little programming, they also will be able to run new and quite different continuous games.